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RESPONSE 
EURO-YEARNINGS? MOVING TOWARD A “SUBSTANTIVE” 
REGISTRATION-BASED TRADEMARK REGIME† 
Jane C. Ginsburg 
n Alan Jay Lerner’s lyric, Professor Henry Higgins laments: “Why 
can’t a woman be more like a man?”1  Professor Rebecca Tushnet’s 
provocative article2 in effect urges that a U.S. trademark should be 
more like a European Union trademark, at least with respect to the re-
lationship of registration to substantive protection.3  The article con-
vincingly exposes the current incoherence in U.S. trademark law — a 
hybrid between “procedural” and “substantive” registration regimes, in 
which the traditional emphasis on use-based trademark rights under-
mines the business-planning benefits that flow from registration. 
Before elaborating on the similarities between Tushnet’s suggested 
reforms of U.S. trademark law and current EU trademark law, this 
Response will articulate the premises underlying use-based and regis-
tration-based systems, premises implicit in Tushnet’s arguments, but 
which may not be apparent to readers unfamiliar with trademark law.  
This Response will then address ways in which the EU trademark reg-
istration system offers a model to implement some of Tushnet’s  
prescriptions. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 † Responding to Rebecca Tushnet, Registering Disagreement: Registration in Modern Ameri-
can Trademark Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 867 (2017). 
  Morton L. Janklow Professor of Literary and Artistic Property Law, Columbia Law School.  
Thanks to Lionel Bently for comments on EU trademark law, and to Nathalie Russell, Columbia 
Law School class of 2018, for research assistance. 
 1 ALAN JAY LERNER & FREDERICK LOEWE, A HYMN TO HIM, in MY FAIR LADY (1956). 
 2 Rebecca Tushnet, Registering Disagreement: Registration in Modern American Trademark 
Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 867 (2017). 
 3 Other aspects of the European Union trademark regime may be less compelling — for ex-
ample the regime’s broader protection against taking unfair advantage of the repute of the trade-
mark.  See Council Regulation 207/2009, on the Community Trade Mark, art. 9(2)(c), 2009 O.J. (L 
78) 1, 5 (EC) (as amended by Regulation 2015/2424, 2015 O.J. (L 341) 21 (EU)) [hereinafter 
EUTMR]; see also infra note 56. 
I 
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I.  THE UNDERLYING PREMISES OF USE-BASED  
AND REGISTRATION-BASED SYSTEMS 
Use-based and registration-based systems rely on distinct, and op-
posing, underlying conceptions of trademark rights.  At one extreme, 
exemplified by use-based systems, trademark law derives from the tra-
ditional common law action of passing off; enforcement of rights in the 
mark protects the public against a competitor’s attempts to mislead 
the public regarding the source or qualities of goods.  The trademark 
owner’s claims are proxies for the public interest in honest marketing.  
But a trademark fills its role of advancing the public’s interest in 
avoiding confusion or deceit only if the public perceives that the 
trademark symbolizes a particular producer’s goods.  Without the con-
sumer-perception link, the symbol does not “identify and distinguish”4 
one producer’s goods, and it therefore is not a trademark.  The link 
arises from the use of the mark in trade.  As the U.S. Supreme Court 
emphasized in 1916 in Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf5: 
[A] man’s right to the continued enjoyment of his trade reputation and the 
good-will that flows from it, free from unwarranted interference by others, 
is a property right, for the protection of which a trade-mark is an instru-
mentality. . . . [T]he right grows out of use, not mere adoption. . . . [T]he 
trade-mark is treated as merely a protection for the good-will, and not the 
subject of property except in connection with an existing business.6 
At the other extreme, exemplified by registration-based systems, 
trademarks are property rights arising out of the government’s ac-
ceptance of the mark for registration.7  Use is not a prerequisite to reg-
istering a distinctive sign, though subsequent failure to exploit the 
mark in trade provides a basis for cancelling the registration.8  As in 
use-based systems, the trademark is a distinctive sign that identifies 
the goods and their producer;9 trademarks therefore protect both the 
producer’s goodwill and the public interest, but it is the registration 
that creates the right.  Registration attests to the sign’s potential to 
link public perception and the registrant,10 but acquisition of rights in 
a distinctive sign is not contingent on demonstrating that the mark has 
in fact acquired secondary meaning.  Thus, an inherently distinctive 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 4 See Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012) (defining “trademark”). 
 5 240 U.S. 403 (1916). 
 6 Id. at 413–14; see also Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879) (“At common law the ex-
clusive right to it grows out of its use, and not its mere adoption.”). 
 7 See EUTMR, supra note 3, art. 6. 
 8 See id. arts. 15(1), 51(1)(a) (requiring genuine use within five years of registration but in fact 
allowing a mark to be maintained without use unless someone applies to have it revoked). 
 9 See id. art. 4. 
 10 See id. art. 7 (declaring a sign’s inability to serve as a trademark if it is “devoid of any dis-
tinctive character,” id. art. 7(1)(b), or is a generic term). 
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mark need not have entered the marketplace (much less proved itself 
there) before legal rights attach.  Equally importantly, registration de-
fines the existence and largely delineates the extent of the rights: a sign 
denied registration — for example for lack of distinctiveness — is not 
an object of protection.  Moreover, the “rule of speciality”11 limits the 
scope of the rights to the goods or services named in the registration.12  
Thus, a use of a mark on goods other than those named in the registra-
tion provides no basis to claim trademark infringement by a party who 
has adopted the same or similar mark for the unnamed goods;13 in a 
use-based system, courts would inquire if the actual use of the mark 
(registered or not) has led to its public perception as a trademark for 
those goods, so that use by other parties would be likely to confuse the 
public concerning the source of marked goods.14  In theory, use-based 
systems’ flexibility focuses primarily on the consumer while registra-
tion-based systems’ greater formalism favors enterprises because it en-
sures predictability in the acquisition and scope of rights. 
As Tushnet explains, the United States has tried to have it both 
ways, grounding rights in use — hence preserving the defining role of 
the marketplace — but then undercutting the significance of use by 
enhancing a trademark’s scope through registration.15  The Lanham 
(Trademark) Act16 provides incentives to register: perhaps most im-
portantly by giving priority dating from filing rather than from first 
use in commerce, and also by making trademark rights enforceable na-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 11 See JOAN ANFOSSI-DIVOL, L’USAGE ET L’ENREGISTREMENT, ÉLÉMENTS 
ESSENTIELS DE L’HARMONISATION DU DROIT DES MARQUES: UNE APPROCHE 
COMPARATIVE DES DROITS FRANCO-COMMUNAUTAIRE ET DES ETATS-UNIS D’AMÉRIQUE 
138 (2003) (“[B]y application of [European] community law, registration is the sole source of 
rights, the rule of speciality circumscribes [rights] to the products or services for which the mark 
was registered.” (translated from French)).  See generally id. at 138–63 (comparing the scope of 
the property right in registration-based and use-based systems). 
 12 Unless the mark is well known and qualifies for protection against dilution under EUTMR 
art. 9(2)(c).  Moreover, the greater the range of goods or services named in the registration, the less 
restraining is the rule of speciality; on the other hand, the registration is subject to cancellation as 
to goods or services named in the registration but for which the registrant is not in fact using the 
mark after five years. 
 13 Except for famous marks receiving dilution protection under EUTMR art. 9(2)(c). 
 14 Similarly, Lanham Act section 2(d) directs that registration may be refused if the mark 
“[c]onsists of or comprises a mark which so resembles a mark registered in the Patent and Trade-
mark Office, or a mark or trade name previously used in the United States by another and not 
abandoned, as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to 
cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.”  15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2012) (emphasis added).  
Dilution of a famous mark is a ground for opposition to registration.  See Lanham Act § 13(a), 15 
U.S.C. § 1063(a). 
 15 Tushnet, supra note 2, at 870–71 (“American scholars . . . have often treated registration like 
a borrowed civil law coat thrown awkwardly over the shoulders of a common law regime. . . . It’s 
time to recognize that it’s our coat and to start making alterations so it fits better.”). 
 16 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1072, 1091–1096, 1111–1127, 1141, 1141a–1141n (2012). 
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tionwide17 (while common law rights would exist in only localities in 
which the mark is in fact used).  Registration thus not only assists title 
holders, but also, by creating a publicly searchable record, aids other 
businesses’ planning by putting them on notice that the registrant 
claims the same or similar mark for the same or similar goods.18  As 
Tushnet also demonstrates, however, refusal to register does not neces-
sarily prevent the unsuccessful applicant from using the mark and 
building up goodwill protectable by unfair competition claims, both at 
state law and under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.19  The disparity 
between grounds for refusal to register and on-the-ground acquisition 
of rights undermines the utility of registration even as it honors the 
role of consumer perception in giving rise to trademark rights.  Even 
the most significant recent development toward convergence of regis-
tration and enforceable rights in fact underscores the disconnect be-
tween the two regimes.  In B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus-
tries, Inc.,20 the Supreme Court ruled that a refusal to register on 
grounds of likelihood of confusion between the applicant’s mark and a 
mark previously registered or used in commerce could have preclusive 
effect in a subsequent infringement action.21  However, the Patent and 
Trademark Office’s (PTO) inquiry into likely confusion does not take 
into account how the marks are actually used in the marketplace, mean-
ing that the decision conflates, rather than unifies, the two regimes.22 
II.  HOW THE EU REGISTRATION-BASED TRADEMARK  
REGIME CAN IMPLEMENT TUSHNET’S PRESCRIPTIONS 
Tushnet’s solutions in several respects endorse the European ap-
proach to trademark registration, including the “double identity” rule, 
which bars the use of the same mark for the same goods as the regis-
trant’s, without requiring a showing of likelihood of confusion.23  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 17 Lanham Act § 7(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c). 
 18 Indeed, Congress shifted the Lanham Act’s emphasis toward security for enterprises when it 
instituted the intent-to-use system, Lanham Act section 1(b), enabling applicants to file on the ba-
sis of an intent to use, rather than on demonstrating actual use.  See S. REP. NO. 100-515, at 4–6 
(1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5581 (“The Lanham Act’s preapplication use re-
quirement . . . creates unnecessary legal uncertainty for a U.S. business planning to introduce 
products or services into the marketplace.  It simply has no assurance that after selecting and 
adopting a mark, and possibly making a sizable investment in packaging, advertising and market-
ing, it will not learn that its use of the mark infringes the rights another acquired through earlier 
use.  In an age of national, if not global, marketing, this has a chilling effect on business invest-
ment.”  Id. at 5.). 
 19 Tushnet, supra note 2, at 878–80. 
 20 135 S. Ct. 1293 (2015). 
 21 Id. at 1299. 
 22 See Tushnet, supra note 2, at 893–99. 
 23 See id. at 932–34; EUTMR, supra note 3, art. 9(2)(a).  Tushnet acknowledges the risk that 
the rule will prove overprotective in the absence of fair use and comparative advertising excep-
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There are other features of the European Union Trade Mark Regula-
tion (EUTMR) not discussed in Tushnet’s article, but whose adoption 
in the United States would be consistent with Tushnet’s prescriptions.  
The remainder of this Response will identify and compare those fea-
tures with the current U.S. registration regime in light of Tushnet’s 
overall objective of making registration more “substantive.”24 
Tushnet advocates a more “substantive” role for registration not in 
order to strengthen the hand of trademark owners but on the contrary 
to reduce the potential for overreach by trademark owners that results 
from the current disparity between an administrative grant of rights 
through registration and judicial enforcement of registered and unreg-
istered trademarks.25  Among the reforms she urges, stricter assess-
ment of the distinctiveness of the mark figures prominently.26  In par-
ticular, she argues the PTO should more vigorously police the border 
between merely descriptive and inherently distinctive signs, for exam-
ple, by “requiring the applicant to show real secondary meaning in the 
market.”27  Under current U.S. trademark law, however, an applicant 
whose mark would be unregistrable on grounds of mere descriptive-
ness28 may seek registration on the basis that the mark has acquired 
distinctiveness, with “proof of substantially exclusive and continuous 
use thereof as a mark by the applicant in commerce for the five years 
before the date on which the claim of distinctiveness is made.”29  Ac-
cording to the Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure (TMEP), 
“[t]he claim of five years of use is generally required to be supported 
by an affidavit or declaration under 37 C.F.R. § 2.20, signed by the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
tions.  Tushnet, supra note 2, at 68.  The Court of Justice of the European Union (C.J.E.U.) has in 
fact tempered the double identity rule by establishing a requirement that the use have “an adverse 
effect on the functions of the trade mark” and then elaborating a range of elusively stated “func-
tions.”  Joined Cases C-236/08 to C-238/08, Google France SARL v. Louis Vuitton Malletier SA, 
2010 E.C.R. I-2467, I-2502.  In 2009, in L’Oréal SA v. Bellure NV,  the C.J.E.U. explained: 
These functions include not only the essential function of the trade mark, which is to 
guarantee to consumers the origin of the goods or services, but also its other functions, in 
particular that of guaranteeing the quality of the goods or services in question and those 
of communication, investment or advertising. 
Case C-487/07, L’Oréal SA v. Bellure NV, 2009 E.C.R. I-5185, I-5187; see also Case C-323/09, 
Interflora Inc., v. Marks & Spencer plc, 2011 E.C.R. I-8625, I-8627 (addressing the function of 
“guaranteeing the quality of that product or service or that of communication, investment or ad-
vertising”); Google France, 2010 E.C.R. at I-2503 (addressing “the function of indicating origin 
and the function of advertising”); Case C-206/01, Arsenal Football Club plc v. Reed, 2002 E.C.R. 
I-10273, I-10316 (“[T]he essential function of a trade mark is to guarantee the identity of origin of 
the marked goods or services to the consumer or end user by enabling him, without any possibil-
ity of confusion, to distinguish the goods or services from others which have another origin.”). 
 24 Tushnet, supra note 2, at 932. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. at 921–26. 
 27 Id. at 922. 
 28 Lanham Act § 2(e), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (2012). 
 29 Id. § 2(f). 
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applicant.”30  The PTO may, but currently is not obliged to, seek proof 
not only of continuous use but also of acquired distinctiveness in 
fact.31  Thus, enforceable nationwide rights may attach to descriptive 
terms just on the applicant’s sworn statement of five years’ continuous 
use.32  Moreover, as a result of a 1988 amendment, the five-year period 
need not have preceded the application date: “any five-year claim 
submitted on or after November 16, 1989, is subject to the new time 
period.  This applies even if the application was filed prior to that 
date.”33  Because rights in registered trademarks run from the date of 
the application,34 the amendment effectively confers trademark priori-
ty on signs that may not have been capable of being a trademark at 
the time of application. 
Compare the EUTMR’s approach to merely descriptive signs that 
have allegedly acquired distinctiveness.  Article 7(1)(c) bars registration 
of “trade marks which consist exclusively of signs or indications which 
may serve, in trade, to designate the kind, quality, quantity, intended 
purpose, value, geographical origin or the time of production of the 
goods or of rendering of the service, or other characteristics of the 
goods or services.”35  Article 7(3), however, provides: “Paragraph 1 . . . 
(c) . . . shall not apply if the trade mark has become distinctive in rela-
tion to the goods or services for which registration is requested in con-
sequence of the use which has been made of it.”36  The European  
Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) Guidelines for Examina-
tion of European Union Trade Marks’s section on acquired distinc-
tiveness37 explains: 
Distinctive character acquired through use means that although the sign 
ab initio lacks inherent distinctiveness with regard to the goods and ser-
vices claimed, owing to the use made of it on the market, the relevant 
public has come to see it as identifying the goods and services claimed in 
the EUTM application as originating from a particular undertaking.38 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 30 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, TRADEMARK 
MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1212.05(d) (Oct. 2016 ed.) [hereinafter TMEP] (citing 
37 C.F.R. § 2.20 (2016)). 
 31 Id. §§ 1212, 1212.06. 
 32 In an infringement action, courts may seek proof of the actual strength of the mark; but as 
Tushnet underscores, some courts may treat the fact of registration as evidence that consumers 
perceive the sign as a trademark.  See Tushnet, supra note 2, at 878–80. 
 33 TMEP, supra note 30, § 1212.05 (citing Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 
100-667, 102 Stat. 3935 (1988) (amending Lanham Act § 2(f))). 
 34 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c). 
 35 EUTMR, supra note 3, art. 7(1)(c). 
 36 Id. art. 7(3). 
 37 EUROPEAN UNION INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE, GUIDELINES FOR EXAMINATION 
OF EUROPEAN UNION TRADEMARKS, PART B SECTION 4, § 2.6 (2016) [hereinafter EUIPO 
GUIDELINES]. 
 38 Id. § 2.6.1. 
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The Guidelines require that the applicant prove “a link between the 
sign and the goods and services for which the sign is applied for, estab-
lishing that the relevant class of persons, or at least a significant pro-
portion thereof, identify goods as originating from a particular under-
taking because of the trade mark.”39  Thus, the EUIPO demands what 
Tushnet would have the PTO require: placement of the burden of 
proof on the applicant to demonstrate through evidence of actual use 
that the sign has in fact acquired secondary meaning.40  Relevant evi-
dence includes: 
[T]he market share held by the mark in question; how intensive, geo-
graphically widespread and long-standing use of the mark has been; the 
amount invested by the undertaking in promoting the mark; the propor-
tion of the relevant class of persons who, because of the mark, identifies 
goods or services as originating from a particular undertaking; and state-
ments from chambers of commerce and industry or other trade and pro-
fessional associations.”41 
Moreover, in contrast to the 1988 amendment to the Lanham Act dis-
cussed above, the EUIPO stresses that “[t]he evidence must prove that 
distinctiveness through use was acquired prior to the EUTM applica-
tion’s filing date.”42 
Finally, the EUIPO Guidelines elaborate a requirement that lacks a 
counterpart in the TMEP but that also responds to Tushnet’s concern 
that trademark registration in the United States may hamper competi-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 39 Id. § 2.6.5. 
 40 Tushnet, supra note 2, at 923.  In addition, as Tushnet observes, id. at 923–24 & nn.246–47, 
European authorities police against bootstrapping a “limping” mark to the registered mark in 
connection with which the weaker sign (often an element of trade dress) appears.  See, e.g., Case 
C-215/14, Société des Produits Nestlé SA v. Cadbury UK Ltd, 2015 E.C.R. 604, 614 (citing Di-
rective 2008/95/EC, art. 3(3), 2008 O.J. (L 299) 25, 27) (“[A]lthough the trade mark for which regis-
tration is sought [the three-dimensional form of the Kit Kat chocolate bar] may have been used as 
part of a registered trade mark or in conjunction with such a mark, the fact remains that, for the 
purposes of the registration of the mark itself, the trade mark applicant must prove that that 
mark alone, as opposed to any other trade mark which may also be present, identifies the particu-
lar undertaking from which the goods originate.”). 
 41 Joined Cases C-217/13 & C-218/13, Oberbank AG v. Deutscher Sparkassen- und 
Giroverband eV, 2014 E.C.R. 2012, 2019 (discussing Directive 2008/95/EC, art. 3(3), which ad-
dresses acquired distinctiveness in the same terms as EUTMR, supra note 3, art. 7(3)).  In that 
case, a survey of relevant consumers showed almost 70% recognition of term as a service mark.  
Id. at 2015; see also Case C-542/07 P, Imagination Technologies Ltd v. OHIM, 2009 E.C.R. I-4937 
(affirming Case T-461/04, Imagination Technologies v. OHIM, 2007 E.C.R. II-122 ¶¶ 70, 74, 79 
(finding £30 million worth of sales of radios under the Pure Digital mark insufficient to prove ac-
quired distinctiveness before date of application for registration because “the applicant should 
have shown not only use of the sign applied for, but in addition the fact that the relevant consum-
er understood the sign not as a descriptive term, but also as a trade mark,” id. ¶ 74)). 
 42 EUIPO GUIDELINES, supra note 37, § 2.6.3; see also id. § 2.6.3.1.  But see EUTMR, supra 
note 3, art. 52(2) (stating that if a mark is registered and is not inherently distinctive when cancel-
lation proceedings are started, the proprietor can resist by showing it has subsequently acquired 
distinctiveness). 
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tion because the PTO may be establishing rights in signs that do not in 
fact identify and distinguish the trademark owner’s goods or ser-
vices.43  Lanham Act registration confers nationwide rights from the 
date of filing; these benefits attach even to a section 2(f) registration 
that issues following the applicant’s affidavit of continuous use (with-
out actual proof of acquired distinctiveness),44 but neither the statute 
nor the TMEP requires that the applicant have used the mark 
throughout the United States.  Thus, a U.S. trademark applicant could 
acquire nationwide rights in a descriptive term without showing that, 
throughout the United States, the mark in fact has come to “identify 
and distinguish” its goods or services in the marketplace.45  By con-
trast, the “unitary character” of the European Union Trade Mark46 
implies that the sign must be distinctive throughout the EU.47  The 
EUIPO draws the conclusion that “acquired distinctiveness must be 
established throughout the territory in which the trade mark did not, 
ab initio, have such character . . . . [T]he unitary character of the  
European Union trade mark requires a sign to possess a distinctive 
character, inherent or acquired through use, throughout the European 
Union.”48  An equivalent U.S. doctrine would similarly oblige the ap-
plicant not only to prove to the PTO that the mark had in fact come to 
symbolize the applicant’s goods or services, but also that the relevant 
consumers throughout the United States drew the necessary connection 
between the mark and the goods or services.49 
Importing these EU rules would promote Tushnet’s goal of count-
ering anticompetitive behavior because they would ensure registration 
of only marks of demonstrated distinctiveness.  The EU approach also 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 43 See Tushnet, supra note 2, at 918–21. 
 44 See 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c) (2012). 
 45 Id. § 1127. 
 46 EUTMR, supra note 3, art. 1(2); see also id. art. 7(2) (stating that if an absolute ground of 
refusal exists with respect to any part of the EU, registration must be refused as to the entire EU). 
 47 On the other hand, the EUTMR does not preempt national trademark registration in mem-
ber states (nor use-based protection in member states that recognize rights on that basis); as a re-
sult, a mark that does not qualify for registration as an EU trademark may still be protected at 
the national level in some subset of the EU’s member states. 
 48 EUIPO GUIDELINES, supra note 37, § 2.6.6 (citations omitted). 
 49 Under the Dawn Donut doctrine, discussed in Tushnet, supra note 2, at 910–11, a federal 
trademark registrant’s nationwide rights are not enforceable against junior users operating in lo-
calities where the registrant is not yet doing business.  See Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, 
Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 364 (2d Cir. 1959).  More recently, however, courts may be more inclined to 
extend injunctive relief to “suppress junior users” (Tushnet’s phrase) in localities to which the reg-
istrant has not yet expanded.  See Guthrie Healthcare Sys. v. ContextMedia, Inc., 826 F.3d 27 (2d 
Cir. 2016) (“[I]t does not follow . . . that a senior user who has proven entitlement to an injunction 
affecting one geographic area by reason of the junior user’s infringement must show the same 
high degree of probability of harm in every further area into which the injunction might extend, 
thus allowing the infringer free use of the infringing mark in all areas as to which the senior user 
has not shown a substantial probability of confusion.”  Id. at 47). 
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buttresses one of Tushnet’s related recommendations.  She remarks 
that “requiring the applicant to show real secondary meaning in the 
market . . . would have positive effects on the ITU [intent to use] sys-
tem as well, since fewer marks would qualify for ITU protection in the 
absence of use and market recognition.”50  This observation deserves 
further elaboration.  A U.S. application based on intent to use a mark 
will qualify for registration once the applicant makes actual use of the 
mark, and if none of the Lanham Act’s bars to registration applies.  
Structurally, the mark must be inherently distinctive: if the mark is 
registrable immediately upon first use in commerce,51 then its 
registrability cannot depend on demonstration of distinctiveness ac-
quired through some period of use.52  But given the market ad-
vantages descriptive terms confer,53 and because the line between in-
herent distinctiveness and mere descriptiveness often wavers,54 the 
system does not necessarily discipline ITU applicants to select marks 
solidly within the spectrum of inherent distinctiveness.  Were an appli-
cant required to demonstrate that borderline marks had acquired dis-
tinctiveness, those marks could not be the subjects of ITU applica-
tions; the ITU applicant therefore would be obliged to select marks far 
from the line of demarcation.  The line’s uncertainty, rather than en-
couraging applicants to approach it as closely as possible, would in-
stead push applicants even further away from the zone of disqualified 
marks. 
The EU approach would achieve a similar result.  There are no 
ITU applications in the EU regime because use is not a prerequisite to 
registration of an inherently distinctive mark.  Instead, the registrant 
has five years to make actual use in trade.55  In effect, the EUTMR 
incorporates ITU for inherently distinctive marks.  But if the mark 
lacks distinctiveness, then the mark cannot be registered unless the 
applicant proves that prior to filing the application, the mark had al-
ready acquired distinctiveness through actual use.  As a result, no 
rights arise without actual use unless the sign is inherently distinctive. 
In conclusion, while I doubt Tushnet would endorse importing eve-
ry aspect of EU trademark law, particularly regarding the scope of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 50 Tushnet, supra note 2, at 922. 
 51 15 U.S.C. § 1051(d) (2012). 
 52 See TMEP, supra note 30, § 1212.09(a) (“Section 2(f), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f), is limited by its 
terms to ‘a mark used by the applicant.’  A claim of distinctiveness under § 2(f) is normally not 
filed in a § 1(b) application before the applicant files an allegation of use, because a claim of ac-
quired distinctiveness, by definition, requires prior use.”). 
 53 See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 2, at 918 & n.220 (citing Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in 
Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 596 (1988)). 
 54 See 2 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 11:18 (4th ed. 
2016). 
 55 See EUMTR, supra note 3, arts. 15(1), 51(1)(a). 
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protection of the mark once registered,56 the EU Trademark Regula-
tion and Directive offer a model of a “substantive” registration regime 
whose adoption could promote fairer competition by better policing 
the claimed sign’s role as a trademark. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 56 For example, compared with U.S. trademark doctrine, courts in the EU have yet to develop 
a robust trademark parody exception.  Compare Rebecca Tushnet, Make Me Walk, Make Me Talk, 
Do Whatever You Please: Barbie and Exceptions, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT THE 
EDGE: THE CONTESTED CONTOURS OF IP 405, 406 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Jane C. 
Ginsburg eds., 2014), with Robin Jacob, Parody and IP claims: A Defence? — A Right to Paro-
dy?, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT THE EDGE, supra, at 427, 431.  In addition, the scope of 
EU protection against dilution, applicable where  
the [defendant’s] sign is identical with, or similar to, the EU trade mark irrespective of 
whether it is used in relation to goods or services which are identical with, similar to or 
not similar to those for which the EU trade mark is registered, where the latter has a 
reputation in the Union and where use of that sign without due cause takes unfair ad-
vantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the EU trade 
mark, 
EUTMR, supra note 3, art. 9(2)(c) (emphasis added), likely is too broad for Tushnet — no fan of 
the dilution doctrine, see generally Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law 
and Cognitive Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507 (2008) — to wish its importation into U.S. law. 
